Safeguarding the “Internet of Things” for victim-survivors of domestic and family violence : anticipating exploitative use and encouraging safety-by-design Andi Broown, Diarmaid Harkin and Leonie Maria Tanczer
By: Brown, Andi
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Contributor(s): Harkin, Diarmaid | Tanczer, Leonie M.
Material type: 
ArticleSeries: Violence Against Women.Publisher: Sage, 2024Subject(s): DOMESTIC VIOLENCE | FAMILY VIOLENCE | INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE | SAFETY | TECHNOLOGY | TECHNOLOGY-FACILITATED ABUSE | VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE | INTERNATIONAL | AUSTRALIAOnline resources: DOI: 10.1177/10778012231222486 (Open access)
In:
Violence Against Women, 2024, First published online, 2 January 2024Summary: Smart, Internet-connected devices—the so-called “Internet of Things” (IoT)—pose significant threats to victim-survivors of domestic and family violence (DFV). IoT systems have been used to abuse, harass, monitor, intimidate, and gaslight victim-survivors. We present findings from an abusability analysis that examined 13 IoT devices and allowed us to make several observations about common vulnerabilities to victim-survivors of DFV. We argue that IoT manufacturers must be encouraged to factor in the implications of DFV in the design of their products. Additionally, technology-facilitated abuse in DFV contexts must feature in industry and government safety-by-design approaches. Our results suggest ways IoT devices can be modified at low cost to alleviate opportunities for misuse, and we endorse IoT manufacturers to consider those risks early in the design stage. (Authors' abstract). Record #8471
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Violence Against Women, 2024, First published online, 2 January 2024
Smart, Internet-connected devices—the so-called “Internet of Things” (IoT)—pose significant threats to victim-survivors of domestic and family violence (DFV). IoT systems have been used to abuse, harass, monitor, intimidate, and gaslight victim-survivors. We present findings from an abusability analysis that examined 13 IoT devices and allowed us to make several observations about common vulnerabilities to victim-survivors of DFV. We argue that IoT manufacturers must be encouraged to factor in the implications of DFV in the design of their products. Additionally, technology-facilitated abuse in DFV contexts must feature in industry and government safety-by-design approaches. Our results suggest ways IoT devices can be modified at low cost to alleviate opportunities for misuse, and we endorse IoT manufacturers to consider those risks early in the design stage. (Authors' abstract). Record #8471
